

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	V
TABLE OF CASES	XIX
Chapter One. An Introduction to Judicial Decision-Making	1
I. What This Course Is About	1
II. A Case to Begin: <i>Brown v. Board of Education</i>	4
<i>Brown v. Board of Education</i>	5
III. What Decided <i>Brown</i> ?	8
A. <i>Brown</i> as Law	8
1. The Meaning of the Text	9
2. The Intentions of the Framing Generation	10
3. Precedent	12
4. And More	15
B. <i>Brown</i> as Ideology	15
C. <i>Brown</i> as Agenda-Setting	19
D. Informational and Institutional Constraints in <i>Brown</i>	23
E. <i>Brown</i> and Decision-Making on a Collegial Court	27
1. <i>Brown</i> I	28
2. <i>Brown</i> II	30
F. Enforcing <i>Brown</i> : Judicial Decision-Making in a Hierarchical System	32
G. Does <i>Brown</i> Shed Light on the Process of Selecting and Retaining Judges?	35
H. Ensuring Compliance After <i>Brown</i> : Judging in a System of Separated Powers	36
1. The Court and the Executive Branch	39
a. The Executive Spurs on the Court	39
b. The Court Needs the Executive	40
2. Congress Steps in	43
I. Public Opinion and Judicial Decision-Making	45
J. What Decided <i>Brown</i> ?	48
Chapter Two. The Limits of Law	51
I. Posing the Question: The Chief Justice's Analogy	51
II. Two Views of Judging	55
A. Legal Formalism	55
<i>United States v. Phelps</i>	55
B. Legal Realism	59
<i>United States v. Smith</i>	59
III. The Scope of Law's Indeterminacy	63
A. Where Law Has Bite 1: Non-Litigated Disputes and Settled Cases	66

B.	Where Law Has Bite 2: Easy Cases	68
C.	Where Law Is Indeterminate: Hard Cases	69
IV.	The Law in Hard Cases	70
A.	Guns and Drugs Continued: Two Supreme Court Decisions..... Smith v. United States	70
B.	What Is Under the Veil of Law? (Could It Be Law?).....	73
1.	The Case	73
2.	The Issue	74
3.	Examining the Precedents	74
4.	The Holding(s).....	76
V.	What Makes Hard Cases Hard?	81
A.	The Limits of Language and Legal Commands.....	82
B.	Rules v. Standards	84
C.	Factual Uncertainty	85
United States v. Locke	85	
D.	What's So Great About Determinacy?.....	88
Riggs v. Palmer.....	89	
	Chapter Three. The Identity of the Judge	95
I.	Introduction	95
A.	Judicial Identity and "Bias"	95
Francolino v. Kuhlman	96	
B.	"Obama Judges" and "Trump Judges"	98
II.	Testing the Attitudinal Model	100
A.	The Basics of Constructing a Study: Data and Variables.....	102
B.	Dependent Variables	102
1.	The Revesz Study	103
2.	The Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Databases	104
C.	Ideology as an Independent Variable: Finding a Proxy.....	109
1.	Party of the Appointing President.....	109
2.	Giles-Hettinger-Peppers Scores.....	114
3.	Segal-Cover Scores	116
D.	Data Analysis.....	121
E.	Selection Bias in Studying Judicial Decisions: Data-Set Problems.....	123
F.	Omitted Variable Bias and "Controlling for Law"	128
1.	The Problem of Omitted-Variable Bias, Generally	129
2.	The Problem of "Controlling for Law"	130
III.	Modeling Judicial Preferences.....	133
A.	A Simple Example	134
B.	Judicial Preferences in a Spatial Setting.....	139
C.	Judicial Utility Functions	144
D.	Spatial Preferences and "Ideology"	147
IV.	Measuring Judicial Preferences	150
A.	The Genesis of the Empirical Study of Judges' Spatial Preferences: Herman Pritchett and the Roosevelt Court	151
B.	Modern Approaches to Measuring Judges' Preferences	159

C.	Where Is the Law in All This?	162
1.	Is There a Second Dimension?.....	163
2.	Does the Left-Right Dimension Vary by Subject?	164
V.	Beyond Partisanship, Politics, and Voting: Demographic Characteristics.....	166
A.	Personal Characteristics: Bias or Perspective?	167
1.	Personal Characteristics as Improper Bias	167
	Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell	167
2.	Life Experience and Judging: O’Connor, Sotomayor, and the Question of a “Woman’s Perspective”	169
B.	Empirically Studying Race, Sex, and Other Characteristics	172
C.	What We Know	173
1.	Sex	173
2.	Race	176
3.	Backgrounds and Experiences.....	177
VI.	What to Make of All This?	181
A.	Which Cases, Which Courts?.....	181
1.	Higher Versus Lower Courts	181
2.	Public Versus Private Law.....	182
3.	Hard Versus Easy Cases	182
B.	Conscious or Subconscious Preferences?.....	184
C.	Reform Options.....	186
1.	Diversity on the Bench.....	187
2.	Voting Rules.....	192
3.	Rules Versus Standards and More Determinate Doctrine	193
D.	Transitional Note: Looking for Constraint in All the Wrong Places.....	196
	Chapter Four. Setting the Judicial Agenda.....	199
I.	Introduction: Case-Based Lawmaking.....	200
A.	Do Cases Make Bad Law?.....	202
B.	Illustration: The First Amendment Meets Libel Law..... New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.....	206 208
II.	Litigants’ Choices.....	224
A.	Litigant Strategy	224
1.	The Decision to File a Complaint	225
2.	To Settle or Not to Settle?.....	227
a.	The Basic Model.....	228
b.	Selection Effects and Win Rates	230
c.	Interpreting Win Rates: A Cautionary Example..... In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.....	235 235
3.	Appeals.....	240
B.	Selection Effects and Judicial Decision-Making: Do the “Haves” Come out Ahead?.....	243
III.	The Power of Attorneys.....	251
A.	Fee-Seeking Attorneys	252

B.	Legal Advocacy Groups	257
1.	Offense: Case Selection	258
2.	Defense: Settlement.....	268
	Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway.....	268
C.	Government Attorneys.....	276
IV.	Legislative Influence and Control.....	284
A.	Direct Control	284
1.	Jurisdiction	284
2.	Delegation Choices	289
B.	Indirect Influence	291
1.	Suit-Boosters.....	292
2.	Suit-Dampeners.....	294
V.	Judicial Agenda-Setting.....	300
A.	Discretionary Jurisdiction	301
B.	Legal Doctrine	303
1.	Justiciability Rules	303
2.	Adjusting Costs and Benefits.....	310
C.	Individual Judges	314
	Chapter Five. Limits on Judicial Capacity	323
I.	Finding Facts and Law in an Adversarial System: The Limits of Judicial Expertise.....	325
A.	Judge Posner’s About-Face	326
	Crawford v. Marion County Election Board et al.....	326
B.	Evidence from the Record—Experts and Lay Witnesses.....	332
1.	What Does “the Record” Look Like? Samples of Testimony.....	332
2.	The Challenges of Expert Testimony	337
	Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner	340
3.	Are All Questions of Fact Equally Suited to Trial?	342
C.	Independent Judicial Research	346
	Rowe v. Gibson.....	349
D.	Briefs of Amicus Curiae	357
II.	Caseload Pressures	364
A.	Managerial Judging: Encouraging Settlement	369
	Shedden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.....	369
	Walker v. Government of the Virgin Islands.....	374
B.	Streamlined Procedures and Summary Decisions	378
1.	Pretrial Screening Techniques	378
2.	Streamlined Procedures on Appeal: Nonargument Calendars and Unpublished Opinions	384
a.	Nonargument Calendars.....	385
b.	Unpublished Opinions.....	386
	Hart v. Massanari.....	388
C.	Judicial Staff: The Role of Law Clerks.....	392

III. The Ripple Effect of Judicial Resource Constraints.....	403
A. Deference Doctrines	403
1. Deference to Lower Courts.....	404
2. Deference to Agencies.....	407
B. Deciding Less	409
United States v. Jones.....	411
C. Rules Versus Standards.....	416
IV. Systemic Fixes?	420
Generalist Judge in a Specialized World.....	421
Chapter Six. Judging in a Hierarchical System	425
I. Introduction to Hierarchy and <i>Stare Decisis</i>	425
A. An Unusual Case	425
Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County	425
B. The Doctrine(s) of <i>Stare Decisis</i>	434
II. Explaining the Hierarchy	438
A. A Single Judge System.....	438
B. Multiple Judges	439
1. Flat System	439
2. Hierarchical System	440
C. Why a Pyramid? Why Three Tiers?.....	442
III. Hierarchy in a Principal Agent Model	447
A. Do Lower Courts Obey Vertical <i>Stare Decisis</i> ? (and What Does That Even Mean?)	449
1. What It Means to “Follow” Precedent	450
United States v. Robinson.....	451
People v. Diaz.....	454
United States v. Wurie.....	458
2. The Distinction Between Holdings and Dicta.....	465
United States v. Crawley	467
3. Studying Compliance with Precedent	470
B. Why Do Lower Courts Obey Precedent? Reversal and Fear of Reversal.....	476
1. Reversal and Judicial Preferences.....	476
2. How Likely Is Reversal?.....	480
3. Perceptions of Reversal: Scarlet Letter or Badge of Honor?	484
4. Expected Utility Redux	489
C. Beyond Reversal: The Tools of the Intermediate Appellate Court.....	489
D. Discretionary Review	492
1. Introduction to the Cert Process and Cue Theory	493
2. Circuit Splits	495
3. Amicus Participation	499
4. Whistleblowers.....	501
5. Nixon Goes to China	503

IV. The Strength and Scope of Precedent	505
A. Precedent vs. Prediction	506
B. Precedent in a World of Changing Facts	510
C. Fractured Precedents: The <i>Marks</i> Rule	512
United States v. Duvall	514
Chapter Seven. Judging on a Collegial Court	525
I. Introduction to Multimember Courts	525
A. “Everyone’s Dean”: Justice Kagan and Consensus Building	525
B. Organization and Procedures on Collegial Courts	528
II. Pros and Cons of Collective Decision-Making	531
A. Why Multiple Judges?	535
1. More Minds Are Better than One (or, So Says Condorcet)	535
2. Deliberative Enhancement	538
B. Problems of Collective Choice	541
1. More Minds Might Be Worse: Information Cascades and Groupthink	541
2. Arrow’s Theorem	545
Bryan v. Indiana	545
3. The Doctrinal Paradox	556
C. Why Majority Voting?	559
III. The Output of a Multimember Court	561
A. Introduction to Multi-Opinion Cases	562
Georgia v. Randolph	562
B. Three Models of Opinion Output	572
C. Trade-Offs	574
IV. Strategic Incentives	584
A. Opinion Writing	586
1. Illustration: <i>Craig v. Boren</i>	587
Craig v. Boren	588
2. Who Controls the Content of Majority Opinions?	597
3. Empirical Evidence	608
4. Strategic Incentives and Separate Opinions	612
B. Opinion Assignment	618
C. Voting	623
1. Strategic Voting on the Supreme Court	623
a. Strategic Incentives	624
b. Normative Evaluation	629
2. Peer Effects	635
D. Case Selection	644
Chapter Eight. Judging in a System of Separated Powers	651
I. Introduction to Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence	651
II. Separation of Powers and Statutory Interpretation	658
A. Lilly Ledbetter’s Story	659
1. The Supreme Court’s Take	660
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire	660

2.	Congress Attempts to Respond.....	666
3.	Elections and a New Result	667
B.	Assessing the <i>Ledbetter</i> Decision: The Legal Approach.....	668
C.	Elected Branch Influence on Statutory Interpretation: A Social- Science Approach.....	671
1.	Setting up a Simple Separation of Powers Model	672
2.	Playing the Separation-of-Powers Game	674
a.	The Basics	674
b.	Adding Pivots	678
c.	Revisiting Ledbetter	679
D.	Should the Current Congress Matter?.....	682
	<i>Bob Jones University v. United States</i>	682
III.	Separation of Powers and Constitutional Interpretation.....	697
A.	The Federalism Revolution: Dissing Congress?	698
B.	Is Judicial Supremacy a Fact?.....	704
1.	“Good Behaviour” Tenure.....	705
2.	Judicial Salaries and Budgets	707
3.	Appellate Jurisdiction	709
4.	Court “Packing”	711
5.	But Today?	715
C.	Separation-of-Powers Models of Constitutional Interpretation	720
1.	Constitutional Separation-of-Powers Games.....	720
2.	Empirically Testing Separation-of-Powers Models	723
D.	Taking Stock, Looking Forward	730
	Chapter Nine. Judicial Selection.....	735
I.	Describing Different Methods of Judicial Selection.....	736
A.	Selection Methods for Federal Judges	736
B.	Selection Methods for State Judges	740
1.	State Courts Around the Time of the Founding.....	740
2.	The Move to Partisan Elections.....	741
3.	Nonpartisan Elections.....	743
4.	Merit Selection.....	744
II.	The Tension Between Independence and Accountability	748
A.	What Is Judicial Independence?.....	748
1.	Decisional Versus Institutional Independence.....	749
2.	Selection Versus Retention	749
	<i>Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.</i>	750
B.	What Is Judicial Accountability?.....	757
1.	Accountability for What?.....	757
a.	Accountability for the Resolution of a Single Case.....	758
b.	Accountability for the Resolution of a Series of Cases ...	761
c.	Accountability over the General Direction of the Law ...	763
2.	Accountability to Whom?	764
3.	Do Elections Ensure Accountability?	766
	<i>League of United Latin American Citizens Council v.</i> <i>Clements</i>	766

4.	What Are Judicial Elections About Anyway?	770
a.	Crime and the Death Penalty	771
b.	Social Issues and Torts	773
C.	Measuring Judicial Independence	776
1.	Studies That Focus on Partisan Alignment	776
2.	Studies That Focus on Institutional Indicators of Independence	779
D.	Measuring Judicial Accountability	783
1.	Do Judicial Elections Affect Behavior?	784
2.	Do Partisan or Nonpartisan Elections Produce More Accountability?	786
III.	Possible Reforms: What Do We Want from Judges? How Do We Use Selection Systems to Maximize That Result?	788
A.	Defining the Traits of an Ideal Judge	789
B.	Creating Incentives for Quality Judging	793
C.	Reforming Merit Selection Systems	795
1.	Politics and Merit Selection	796
2.	Judicial Quality and Diversity	798
3.	Accountability	799
4.	Elitism and Bias	801
5.	Interest Groups	803
D.	Reforming Judicial Elections	804
1.	Are Judicial Elections Different?	805
	Republican Party of Minn. v. White	805
2.	Campaign Finance Reform for Judicial Elections	814
a.	Contribution Limits	815
b.	Expenditure Limits	815
c.	Limits on Who Gives to Judicial Elections	816
d.	Limits on Who Can Ask for Money	817
	Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar	817
e.	Public Financing of Elections	828
	Chapter Ten. Public Opinion and Judging	831
I.	“The Case of the Century”	831
II.	Why and How Does Public Opinion Influence Courts?	838
A.	The Death Penalty as a Case Study	838
	Furman v. Georgia	838
B.	What Is the Mechanism?	848
1.	The Federal Appointments Process	850
2.	The State Appointment (and Retention) Process	854
3.	Separation of Powers	855
4.	Doctrine	857
	Roper v. Simmons	857
5.	The Desire for Popularity	863
C.	Where Do Justices Get Their Information?	869
1.	The Law Itself	869
2.	Amicus Briefs	871

3.	Blogs, etc.	871
4.	Public Protests	872
5.	Polarization	872
III.	Testing the Effect of Public Opinion	873
A.	Constructing a Study	873
1.	The (Unfortunately) Impossible Experiment.....	873
2.	Measuring Public Opinion	874
3.	Complications.....	877
B.	What Do We Know About the Relationship Between Public Opinion and Judicial Outcomes?	879
1.	Anecdotal or Historical Evidence	879
2.	Social-Scientific Evidence	881
IV.	How Courts Affect Public Opinion	892
A.	Setting up the Problem	892
	Hollingsworth v. Perry et al.....	892
B.	A Word of History: The Backlash Thesis	904
C.	How Courts (Might) Affect Public Opinion	908
1.	Studying How Courts Affect Public Opinion	908
2.	Hypotheses	910
3.	The Evidence.....	912
V.	How Should We Feel About Public Opinion and Judicial Decision- Making?.....	918
A.	Criminal Cases	918
	Moore et al. v. Dempsey, Keeper of Arkansas State Penitentiary	918
B.	Statutory Cases	922
C.	Constitutional Cases	925
D.	The Common Law.....	929
	INDEX.....	933