

CONFLICT OF LAWS

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

CASES AND MATERIALS

SIXTEENTH EDITION

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2023 Annual Update

Chapter 3. Jurisdiction of Courts

Section 2. Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction over Natural and Legal Persons

B. Modern Jurisdictional Standards: The Era of International Shoe, “Minimum Contacts,” and “Fairness”

At page 120, please add the following at the end of Note 3:

On July 2, 2019 The Hague Conference on Private International Law concluded negotiations on a “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters” (“Hague Judgments Convention” or “Convention”). The Hague Judgments Convention is open for ratification by any nation. Once two nations have ratified or acceded to it, the Convention goes into force a year later.

The European Union recently ratified the Convention (except for Denmark), but as a bloc of nations this only counts as one ratification, though it seems likely that other nations will ratify shortly. The Convention sets “indirect” rules of jurisdiction, in that any judgment that is founded on an acceptable basis for jurisdiction becomes “eligible” for recognition and enforcement in the recognizing nation. The thirteen bases are set forth in Article 5(1) of the Convention, and include the defendant (“judgment debtor”) was habitually resident in the nation that rendered the judgment, the judgment debtor had its principal place of business in the judgment-rendering nation and the cause action arose from those activities, the judgment debtor consented — or did not timely raise an objection — to jurisdiction, or the judgment debtor engaged in a tortious action in the judgment-rendering nation.

However, there are some important caveats. The Convention does not purport to require nearly automatic recognition of judgments, as does the Full Faith and Credit Clause as to judgments of one U.S. court being enforced in another U.S. court. Critically, even if a judgment has a sound jurisdictional basis under the Convention, nations can still refuse to recognize judgments that are “manifestly incompatible . . . with the public policy” of the recognizing nation. It seems likely that if the U.S. ever ratifies the Convention, other nations will refuse to recognize large tort judgments rendered in U.S. courts. Nations on ratification can also include a reservation that they will not apply the Convention to judgments rendered in other specified nations.

The United States has signed the Convention but has not ratified it and political realities are such that ratification is likely to be, at best, a long-run process.

The E.U.’s ratification is likely, once the Convention goes into effect, to present some interesting questions as to the relationship between the Convention and the Brussels Regulations. The Convention and the Regulations are broadly similar, but not identical. One possible approach is that the plaintiff (“judgment creditor”) can elect to enforce the judgment under the Regulations or the Convention or both.

At page 152, please replace *Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg*, and the Notes following it (pages 159-60) with the following:

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District

Supreme Court of the United States, 2021

592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In each of these two cases, a state court held that it had jurisdiction over Ford Motor Company in a products liability suit stemming from a car accident. The accident happened in the State where suit was brought. The victim was one of the State’s residents. And Ford did substantial business in the State—among other things, advertising, selling, and servicing the model of vehicle the suit claims is defective. Still, Ford contends that jurisdiction is improper because the particular car involved in the crash was not first sold in the forum State, nor was it designed or manufactured there. We reject that argument. When a company like Ford serves a market for a product in a State and that product causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the State’s courts may entertain the resulting suit.

I

Ford is a global auto company. It is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Michigan. But its business is everywhere. Ford markets, sells, and services its products across the United States and overseas. In this country alone, the company annually distributes over 2.5 million new cars, trucks, and SUVs to over 3,200 licensed dealerships. Ford also encourages a resale market for its products: Almost all its dealerships buy and sell used Fords, as well as selling new ones. To enhance its brand and increase its sales, Ford engages in wide-ranging promotional activities, including television, print, online, and direct-mail advertisements. No matter where you live, you’ve seen them: “Have you driven a Ford lately?” or “Built Ford Tough.” Ford also ensures that consumers can keep their vehicles running long past the date of sale. The company provides original parts to auto supply stores and repair shops across the country. (Goes another slogan: “Keep your Ford a Ford.”) And Ford’s own network of dealers offers an array of maintenance and repair services, thus fostering an ongoing relationship between Ford and its customers.

Accidents involving two of Ford’s vehicles—a 1996 Explorer and a 1994 Crown Victoria—are at the heart of the suits before us. One case comes from Montana. Markkaya Gullett was driving her Explorer near her home in the State when the tread separated from a rear tire. The vehicle spun out, rolled into a ditch, and came to rest upside down. Gullett died at the scene of the crash. The representative of her estate sued Ford in Montana state court, bringing claims for a design defect, failure to warn, and negligence. The second case comes from Minnesota. Adam Bandemer was a passenger in his friend’s Crown Victoria, traveling on a rural road in the State to a favorite ice-fishing spot. When his friend rear-ended a snowplow, this car too landed in a ditch. Bandemer’s air bag failed to deploy, and he suffered serious brain damage. He sued Ford in Minnesota state court, asserting products-liability, negligence, and breach-of-warranty claims.

Ford moved to dismiss the two suits for lack of personal jurisdiction, on basically identical grounds. According to Ford, the state court (whether in Montana or Minnesota) had jurisdiction only if the company’s conduct in the State had given rise to the plaintiff’s claims. And that causal link existed, Ford continued, only if the company had designed, manufactured, or—most likely—sold in the State the particular vehicle involved in the accident. In neither suit could the plaintiff make that showing. Ford had designed the Explorer and Crown Victoria in Michigan, and it had manufactured the cars in (respectively) Kentucky and Canada. Still more, the company had originally sold the cars at issue outside the forum States—the Explorer in Washington, the Crown Victoria in North Dakota. Only later resales and relocations by consumers had brought the vehicles to Montana and Minnesota. That meant, in Ford’s view, that the courts of those States could not decide the suits.

Both the Montana and the Minnesota Supreme Courts (affirming lower court decisions) rejected Ford’s argument. The Montana court began by detailing the varied ways Ford “purposefully” seeks to “serve the market in Montana.” 395 Mont. 478, 488 (2019). The company advertises in the State; “has thirty-six dealerships” there; “sells automobiles, specifically Ford Explorers[,] and parts” to Montana residents; and provides them with “certified repair, replacement, and recall services.” *Ibid.* Next, the court assessed the relationship between those activities and the Gullett suit. Ford’s conduct, said the court, encourages “Montana residents to drive Ford vehicles.” *Id.*, at 491. When that driving causes in-state injury, the ensuing claims have enough of a tie to Ford’s Montana activities to support jurisdiction. Whether Ford “designed, manufactured, or sold [the] vehicle” in the State, the court concluded, is “immaterial.” *Ibid.* Minnesota’s Supreme Court agreed. It highlighted how Ford’s “marketing and advertisements” influenced state residents to “purchase and drive more Ford vehicles.” 931 N. W. 2d 744, 754 (2019). Indeed, Ford had sold in Minnesota “more than 2,000 1994 Crown Victoria[s]”—the “very type of car” involved in Bandemer’s suit. *Id.*, at 751, 754. That the “*particular vehicle*” injuring him was “designed, manufactured, [and first] sold” elsewhere made no difference. *Id.*, at 753 (emphasis in original). In the court’s view, Ford’s Minnesota activities still had the needed connection to Bandemer’s allegations that a defective Crown Victoria caused in-state injury. See *id.*, at 754.

We granted certiorari to consider if Ford is subject to jurisdiction in these cases. We hold that it is.

II A

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. The canonical decision in this area remains *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). There, the Court held that a tribunal’s authority depends on the defendant’s having such “contacts” with the forum State that “the maintenance of the suit” is “reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,” and “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” In giving content to that formulation, the Court has long focused on the nature and extent of “the defendant’s relationship to the forum State.” *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty.*, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (citing cases). That focus led to our recognizing two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes

called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction. See *Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown*, 564 U. S. 915, 919 (2011).

[The Court reviewed that a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction where it is “at home,” which, for a corporation, includes the state of incorporation and the state of its principal place of business. Ford, therefore, was not subject to general jurisdiction in Montana or Minnesota.]

Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims. The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name “purposeful availment.” *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U. S. 462, 475 (1985). The defendant, we have said, must take “some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” *Hanson v. Denckla*, 357 U. S. 235, 253 (1958). The contacts must be the defendant’s own choice and not “random, isolated, or fortuitous.” *Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.*, 465 U. S. 770, 774 (1984). They must show that the defendant deliberately “reached out beyond” its home—by, for example, “exploit[ing] a market” in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there. *Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U. S. 277, 285 (2014). Yet even then—because the defendant is not “at home”—the forum State may exercise jurisdiction in only certain cases. The plaintiff’s claims, we have often stated, “must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts” with the forum. *Bristol-Myers*, 582 U. S., at ___ (quoting *Daimler [AG v. Bauman]*, 571 U. S. [117], at 127[(2014)]); see, e.g., *Burger King*, 471 U. S., at 472; *Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall*, 466 U. S. 408, 414 (1984); *International Shoe*, 326 U. S., at 319. Or put just a bit differently, “there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’” *Bristol-Myers*, 582 U. S., at ___ (quoting *Goodyear*, 564 U. S., at 919).

These rules derive from and reflect two sets of values—treating defendants fairly and protecting “interstate federalism.” *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*, 444 U. S. 286, 293[, 297-298] (1980). Our decision in *International Shoe* founded specific jurisdiction on an idea of reciprocity between a defendant and a State: When (but only when) a company “exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state”—thus “enjoy[ing] the benefits and protection of [its] laws”—the State may hold the company to account for related misconduct. 326 U. S., at 319; see *Burger King*, 471 U. S., at 475–476. Later decisions have added that our doctrine similarly provides defendants with “fair warning”—knowledge that “a particular activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” *Id.*, at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted); *World-Wide Volkswagen*, 444 U. S., at 297 (likewise referring to “clear notice”). A defendant can thus “structure [its] primary conduct” to lessen or avoid exposure to a given State’s courts. And this Court has considered alongside defendants’ interests those of the States in relation to each other. One State’s “sovereign power to try” a suit, we have recognized, may prevent “sister States” from exercising their like authority. The law of specific jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure that States with “little legitimate interest” in a suit do not encroach on States more affected by the controversy. *Bristol-Myers*, 582 U. S., at ___.²

² One of the concurrences here expresses a worry that our *International Shoe*-based body of law is not “well suited for the way in which business is now conducted,” and tentatively suggests a 21st-century rethinking. (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). Fair enough perhaps * * * but the concurrence then acknowledges that these cases have no

B

Ford contends that our jurisdictional rules prevent Montana’s and Minnesota’s courts from deciding these two suits. In making that argument, Ford does not contest that it does substantial business in Montana and Minnesota— that it actively seeks to serve the market for automobiles and related products in those States. Or to put that concession in more doctrinal terms, Ford agrees that it has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities” in both places. *Hanson*, 357 U. S., at 253. Ford’s claim is instead that those activities do not sufficiently connect to the suits, even though the resident-plaintiffs allege that Ford cars malfunctioned in the forum States. In Ford’s view, the needed link must be causal in nature: Jurisdiction attaches “only if the defendant’s forum conduct *gave rise to* the plaintiff’s claims.” Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis in original). And that rule reduces, Ford thinks, to locating specific jurisdiction in the State where Ford sold the car in question, or else the States where Ford designed and manufactured the vehicle. On that view, the place of accident and injury is immaterial. So (Ford says) Montana’s and Minnesota’s courts have no power over these cases.

But Ford’s causation-only approach finds no support in this Court’s requirement of a “connection” between a plaintiff’s suit and a defendant’s activities. *Bristol-Myers*, 582 U. S., at _____. That rule indeed serves to narrow the class of claims over which a state court may exercise specific jurisdiction. But not quite so far as Ford wants. None of our precedents has suggested that only a strict causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation will do. As just noted, our most common formulation of the rule demands that the suit “arise out of *or relate to* the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” (quoting *Daimler*, 571 U. S., at 127; emphasis added; alterations omitted). The first half of that standard asks about causation; but the back half, after the “or,” contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase “relate to” incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. But again, we have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s claim came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct. See also *Bristol-Myers*, 582 U. S., at _____, _____ (quoting *Goodyear*, 564 U. S., at 919) (asking whether there is “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,” without demanding that the inquiry focus on cause). So the case is not over even if, as Ford argues, a causal test would put jurisdiction in only the States of first sale, manufacture, and design. A different State’s courts may yet have jurisdiction, because of another “activity [or] occurrence” involving the defendant that takes place in the State. *Bristol-Myers*, 582 U. S., at _____, _____ (quoting *Goodyear*, 564 U. S., at 919).³

distinctively modern features, and it decides them on grounds that (it agrees) are much the same as ours. The other concurrence proposes instead a return to the mid-19th century – a replacement of our current doctrine with the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning respecting personal jurisdiction. (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). But that opinion never reveals just what the Due Process Clause as understood at its ratification required, and its ground for deciding these cases is correspondingly spare. This opinion, by contrast, resolves these cases by proceeding as the Court has done for the last 75 years – applying the standards set out in *International Shoe* and its progeny, with attention to their underlying values of ensuring fairness and protecting interstate federalism.

³ In thus reiterating this Court’s longstanding approach, we reject JUSTICE GORSUCH’s apparent (if oblique) view that a state court should have jurisdiction over a nationwide corporation like Ford on *any* claim, no matter how unrelated to the State or Ford’s activities there. On that view, for example, a California court could hear a claim

And indeed, this Court has stated that specific jurisdiction attaches in cases identical to the ones here—when a company like Ford serves a market for a product in the forum State and the product malfunctions there. In *World-Wide Volkswagen*, the Court held that an Oklahoma court could not assert jurisdiction over a New York car dealer just because a car it sold later caught fire in Oklahoma. 444 U. S., at 295. But in so doing, we contrasted the dealer’s position to that of two other defendants—Audi, the car’s manufacturer, and Volkswagen, the car’s nationwide importer (neither of which contested jurisdiction):

“[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in [several or all] other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.” *Id.*, at 297.

Or said another way, if Audi and Volkswagen’s business deliberately extended into Oklahoma (among other States), then Oklahoma’s courts could hold the companies accountable for a car’s catching fire there—even though the vehicle had been designed and made overseas and sold in New York. For, the Court explained, a company thus “purposefully avail[ing] itself” of the Oklahoma auto market “has clear notice” of its exposure in that State to suits arising from local accidents involving its cars. *Ibid.* And the company could do something about that exposure: It could “act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are [still] too great, severing its connection with the State.” *Ibid.*

Our conclusion in *World-Wide Volkswagen*—though, as Ford notes, technically “dicta,” has appeared and reappeared in many cases since. So, for example, the Court in *Keeton* invoked that part of *World-Wide Volkswagen* to show that when a corporation has “continuously and deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State’s] court[s]” to defend actions “based on” products causing injury there. 465 U. S., at 781; see *Burger King*, 471 U. S., at 472–473 (similarly citing *World-Wide Volkswagen*). On two other occasions, we reaffirmed that rule by reciting the above block-quoted language verbatim. See *Goodyear*, 564 U. S., at 927; *Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.*, 480 U. S. 102, 110 (1987) (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.). And in *Daimler*, we used the Audi/Volkswagen scenario as a paradigm case of specific jurisdiction (though now naming Daimler, the maker of Mercedes Benzes). Said the Court, to “illustrat[]” specific jurisdiction’s “province[]”: A California court would exercise specific jurisdiction “if a California plaintiff, injured in a California accident involving a Daimler-manufactured vehicle, sued Daimler [in that court] alleging that the vehicle was defectively designed.” 571 U. S., at 127, n. 5. As in *World-Wide Volkswagen*, the Court did not limit jurisdiction to where the car was designed, manufactured, or first sold. Substitute Ford for Daimler, Montana and Minnesota for California, and the Court’s “illustrat[ive]” case becomes . . . the two cases before us.

against Ford brought by an Ohio plaintiff based on an accident occurring in Ohio involving a car purchased in Ohio. Removing the need for any connection between the case and forum State would transfigure our specific jurisdiction standard as applied to corporations. “Case-linked” jurisdiction would then become not case-linked at all.

To see why Ford is subject to jurisdiction in these cases (as Audi, Volkswagen, and Daimler were in their analogues), consider first the business that the company regularly conducts in Montana and Minnesota. Small wonder that Ford has here conceded “purposeful availment” of the two States’ markets. By every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail— Ford urges Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars—again including those two models—are available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota. And apart from sales, Ford works hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars’ owners. The company’s dealers in Montana and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford cars, including those whose warranties have long since expired. And the company distributes replacement parts both to its own dealers and to independent auto shops in the two States. Those activities, too, make Ford money. And by making it easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.

Now turn to how all this Montana- and Minnesota-based conduct relates to the claims in these cases, brought by state residents in Montana’s and Minnesota’s courts. Each plaintiff’s suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of those States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehicle—an Explorer in one, a Crown Victoria in the other—caused the crash and resulting harm. And as just described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both States for many years. (Contrast a case, which we do not address, in which Ford marketed the models in only a different State or region.) In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States. So there is a strong “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation”—the “essential foundation” of specific jurisdiction. *Helicopteros*, 466 U. S., at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is why this Court has used this exact fact pattern (a resident-plaintiff sues a global car company, extensively serving the state market in a vehicle, for an in-state accident) as an illustration—even a paradigm example—of how specific jurisdiction works. See *Daimler*, 571 U. S., at 127, n. 5.⁴

The only complication here, pressed by Ford, is that the company sold the specific cars involved in these crashes outside the forum States, with consumers later selling them to the States’ residents. Because that is so, Ford argues, the plaintiffs’ claims “would be precisely the same if Ford had never done anything in Montana and Minnesota.” Of course, that argument merely restates Ford’s demand for an exclusively causal test of connection— which we have already

⁴ None of this is to say that any person using any means to sell any good in a State is subject to jurisdiction there if the product malfunctions after arrival. We have long treated isolated or sporadic transactions differently from continuous ones. See, e.g., *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*, 444 U. S. 286, 297 (1980). And we do not here consider internet transactions, which may raise doctrinal questions of their own. See *Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U. S. 277, 290, n. 9 (2014) (“[T]his case does not present the very different questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘contacts’ with a particular State”). So consider, for example, a hypothetical offered at oral argument. “[A] retired guy in a small town” in Maine “carves decoys” and uses “a site on the Internet” to sell them. “Can he be sued in any state if some harm arises from the decoy?” *Ibid*. The differences between that case and the ones before us virtually list themselves. (Just consider all our descriptions of Ford’s activities outside its home bases.) So we agree with the plaintiffs’ counsel that resolving these cases does not also resolve the hypothetical.

shown is inconsistent with our caselaw. And indeed, a similar assertion could have been made in *World-Wide Volkswagen*—yet the Court made clear that systematic contacts in Oklahoma rendered Audi accountable there for an in-state accident, even though it involved a car sold in New York. So too here, and for the same reasons—even supposing (as Ford does) that without the company’s Montana or Minnesota contacts the plaintiffs’ claims would be just the same.

But in any event, that assumption is far from clear. For the owners of these cars might never have bought them, and so these suits might never have arisen, except for Ford’s contacts with their home States. Those contacts might turn any resident of Montana or Minnesota into a Ford owner—even when he buys his car from out of state. He may make that purchase because he saw ads for the car in local media. And he may take into account a raft of Ford’s in-state activities designed to make driving a Ford convenient there: that Ford dealers stand ready to service the car; that other auto shops have ample supplies of Ford parts; and that Ford fosters an active resale market for its old models. The plaintiffs here did not in fact establish, or even allege, such causal links. But cf. post, at 3–4 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (nonetheless finding some kind of causation). Nor should jurisdiction in cases like these ride on the exact reasons for an individual plaintiff’s purchase, or on his ability to present persuasive evidence about them.⁵ But the possibilities listed above—created by the reach of Ford’s Montana and Minnesota contacts—underscore the aptness of finding jurisdiction here, even though the cars at issue were first sold out of state.

For related reasons, allowing jurisdiction in these cases treats Ford fairly, as this Court’s precedents explain. In conducting so much business in Montana and Minnesota, Ford “enjoys the benefits and protection of [their] laws”—the enforcement of contracts, the defense of property, the resulting formation of effective markets. *International Shoe*, 326 U. S., at 319. All that assistance to Ford’s in-state business creates reciprocal obligations—most relevant here, that the car models Ford so extensively markets in Montana and Minnesota be safe for their citizens to use there. Thus our repeated conclusion: A state court’s enforcement of that commitment, enmeshed as it is with Ford’s government-protected in-state business, can “hardly be said to be undue.” *Ibid.* And as *World-Wide Volkswagen* described, it cannot be thought surprising either. An automaker regularly marketing a vehicle in a State, the Court said, has “clear notice” that it will be subject to jurisdiction in the State’s courts when the product malfunctions there (regardless where it was first sold). Precisely because that exercise of jurisdiction is so reasonable, it is also predictable—and thus allows Ford to “structure [its] primary conduct” to lessen or even avoid the costs of state-court litigation.

Finally, principles of “interstate federalism” support jurisdiction over these suits in Montana and Minnesota. Those States have significant interests at stake—“providing [their] residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors,” as well as enforcing their own safety regulations. *Burger King*, 471 U. S., at 473; see *Keeton*, 465 U. S., at 776. Consider, next to those, the interests of the States of first sale (Washington and North Dakota)—which Ford’s proposed rule would make the most likely forums. For each of those States, the suit involves all out-of-state parties, an out-of-state accident, and out-of-state injuries; the suit’s only connection with the State is that a former owner once (many years earlier) bought

⁵ It should, for example, make no difference if a plaintiff had recently moved to the forum State with his car, and had not made his purchasing decision with that move in mind—so had not considered any of Ford’s activities in his new home State.

the car there. In other words, there is a less significant “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” *Walden*, 571 U. S., at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted). So by channeling these suits to Washington and North Dakota, Ford’s regime would undermine, rather than promote, what the company calls the Due Process Clause’s “jurisdiction-allocating function.”

C

Ford mainly relies for its rule on two of our recent decisions—*Bristol-Myers* and *Walden*. But those precedents stand for nothing like the principle Ford derives from them. If anything, they reinforce all we have said about why Montana’s and Minnesota’s courts can decide these cases.

Ford says of *Bristol-Myers* that it “squarely foreclose[s]” jurisdiction. In that case, non-resident plaintiffs brought claims in California state court against Bristol-Myers Squibb, the manufacturer of a nationally marketed prescription drug called Plavix. The plaintiffs had not bought Plavix in California; neither had they used or suffered any harm from the drug there. Still, the California Supreme Court thought it could exercise jurisdiction because Bristol-Myers Squibb sold Plavix in California and was defending there against identical claims brought by the State’s residents. This Court disagreed, holding that the exercise of jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In Ford’s view, the same must be true here. Each of these plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in *Bristol-Myers*, alleged injury from a particular item (a car, a pill) that the defendant had sold outside the forum State. Ford reads *Bristol-Myers* to preclude jurisdiction when that is true, even if the defendant regularly sold “the same kind of product” in the State.

But that reading misses the point of our decision. We found jurisdiction improper in *Bristol-Myers* because the forum State, and the defendant’s activities there, lacked any connection to the plaintiffs’ claims. See 582 U. S., at ___ (“What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue”). The plaintiffs, the Court explained, were not residents of California. They had not been prescribed Plavix in California. They had not ingested Plavix in California. And they had not sustained their injuries in California. See *ibid.* (emphasizing these points). In short, the plaintiffs were engaged in forum-shopping—suing in California because it was thought plaintiff-friendly, even though their cases had no tie to the State. See *id.*, at ___ (distinguishing the Plavix claims from the litigation in *Keeton*, see *supra*, at 10, because they “involv[e] no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the forum State”). That is not at all true of the cases before us. Yes, Ford sold the specific products in other States, as Bristol-Myers Squibb had. But here, the plaintiffs are residents of the forum States. They used the allegedly defective products in the forum States. And they suffered injuries when those products malfunctioned in the forum States. In sum, each of the plaintiffs brought suit in the most natural State—based on an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that t[ook] place” there. *Bristol-Myers*, 582 U. S., at ___. So *Bristol-Myers* does not bar jurisdiction.

Ford falls back on *Walden* as its last resort. In that case, a Georgia police officer working at an Atlanta airport searched, and seized money from, two Nevada residents before they embarked on a flight to Las Vegas. The victims of the search sued the officer in Nevada, arguing that their alleged injury (their inability to use the seized money) occurred in the State in which they lived. This Court held the exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada improper even though “the plaintiff[s]

experienced [the] effect[s]” of the officer’s conduct there. 571 U. S., at 290. According to Ford, our ruling shows that a plaintiff’s residence and place of injury can never support jurisdiction. And without those facts, Ford concludes, the basis for jurisdiction crumbles here as well.

But *Walden* has precious little to do with the cases before us. In *Walden*, only the plaintiffs had any contacts with the State of Nevada; the defendant-officer had never taken any act to “form[] a contact” of his own. The officer had “never traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada.” *Id.*, at 289. So to use the language of our doctrinal test: He had not “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of conducting activities” in the forum State. *Hanson*, 357 U. S., at 253. Because that was true, the Court had no occasion to address the necessary connection between a defendant’s in-state activity and the plaintiff’s claims. But here, Ford has a veritable truckload of contacts with Montana and Minnesota, as it admits. The only issue is whether those contacts are related enough to the plaintiffs’ suits. As to that issue, so what if (as *Walden* held) the place of a plaintiff’s injury and residence cannot create a defendant’s contact with the forum State? Those places still may be relevant in assessing the link between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s suit—including its assertions of who was injured where. And indeed, that relevance is a key part of *Bristol-Myers*’ reasoning. See 582 U. S., at ___ (finding a lack of “connection” in part because the “plaintiffs are not California residents and do not claim to have suffered harm in that State”). One of Ford’s own favorite cases thus refutes its appeal to the other.

* * *

Here, resident-plaintiffs allege that they suffered in-state injury because of defective products that Ford extensively promoted, sold, and serviced in Montana and Minnesota. For all the reasons we have given, the connection between the plaintiffs’ claims and Ford’s activities in those States— or otherwise said, the “relationship among the defendant, the forum[s], and the litigation”—is close enough to support specific jurisdiction. *Walden*, 571 U. S., at 284. The judgments of the Montana and Minnesota Supreme Courts are therefore affirmed.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE BARRETT took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

ALITO, J., concurring in the judgment.

These cases can and should be decided without any alteration or refinement of our case law on specific personal jurisdiction. To be sure, for the reasons outlined in JUSTICE GORSUCH’S thoughtful opinion, there are grounds for questioning the standard that the Court adopted in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). And there are also reasons to wonder whether the case law we have developed since that time is well suited for the way in which business is now conducted. But there is nothing distinctively 21st century about the question in the cases now before us, and the answer to that question is settled by our case law.

...

Ford . . . asks us to adopt an unprecedented rule under which a defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be proven to have been a but-for cause of the tort plaintiff’s injury. The Court properly rejects that argument, and I agree with the main thrust of the Court’s opinion. My only quibble is with the new gloss that the Court puts on our case law. Several of our opinions have said that a plaintiff’s claims “‘must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’” with the forum. The Court parses this phrase “as though we were dealing with language of a statute,” *Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.*, 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979), and because this phrase is cast in the disjunctive, the Court recognizes a new category of cases in which personal jurisdiction is permitted: those in which the claims do not “‘arise out of’” (i.e., are not caused by) the defendant’s contacts but nevertheless sufficiently “‘relate to’” those contacts in some undefined way.

This innovation is unnecessary and, in my view, unwise. To say that the Constitution does not require the kind of proof of causation that Ford would demand—what the majority describes as a “strict causal relationship”—is not to say that no causal link of any kind is needed. And here, there is a sufficient link. It is reasonable to infer that the vehicles in question here would never have been on the roads in Minnesota and Montana if they were some totally unknown brand that had never been advertised in those States, was not sold in those States, would not be familiar to mechanics in those States, and could not have been easily repaired with parts available in those States. See *ante*, at 13–14 (describing this relationship between Ford’s activities and these suits). The whole point of those activities was to put more Fords (including those in question here) on Minnesota and Montana roads. The common-sense relationship between Ford’s activities and these suits, in other words, is causal in a broad sense of the concept, and personal jurisdiction can rest on this type of link without strict proof of the type Ford would require. When “‘arise out of’” is understood in this way, it is apparent that “‘arise out of’” and “‘relate to’” overlap and are not really two discrete grounds for jurisdiction. The phrase “‘arise out of or relate to’” is simply a way of restating the basic “‘minimum contacts’” standard adopted in *International Shoe*.

Recognizing “‘relate to’” as an independent basis for specific jurisdiction risks needless complications. The “‘ordinary meaning’” of the phrase “‘relate to’” “‘is a broad one.’” *Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*, 504 U. S. 374, 383 (1992). Applying that phrase “‘according to its terms [is] a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else.’” *California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc.*, 519 U. S. 316, 335 (1997) (SCALIA, J., concurring). . . . [W]hat limits the potentially boundless reach of “‘relate to’” is just the sort of rough causal connection I have described.

I would leave the law exactly where it stood before we took these cases, and for that reason, I concur in the judgment.

JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the judgment.

Since *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), this Court’s cases have sought to divide the world of personal jurisdiction in two. A tribunal with “‘general jurisdiction’” may entertain any claim against the defendant. But to trigger this power, a court usually must ensure the defendant is “‘at home’” in the forum State. *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 571 U. S. 117, 137 (2014). Meanwhile, “‘specific jurisdiction’” affords a narrower authority. It applies only when the defendant “‘purposefully avails’” itself of the opportunity to do business in the forum State

and the suit “‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to’” the defendant’s contacts with the forum State. *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U. S. 462, 472, 475 (1985).

While our cases have long admonished lower courts to keep these concepts distinct, some of the old guardrails have begun to look a little battered. . . .

. . . Until now, many lower courts have proceeded on the premise that specific jurisdiction requires two things. First, the defendant must “purposefully avail” itself of the chance to do business in a State. Second, the plaintiff’s suit must “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s in-state activities. Typically, courts have read this second phrase as a unit requiring at least a but-for causal link between the defendant’s local activities and the plaintiff’s injuries. E.g., *Tamburo v. Dworkin*, 601 F. 3d 693, 708–709 (CA7 2010) (collecting cases); see also *Burger King*, 471 U. S., at 475 (discussing “proximate[] results”). As every first year law student learns, a but-for causation test isn’t the most demanding. At a high level of abstraction, one might say any event in the world would not have happened “but for” events far and long removed.

Now, though, the Court pivots away from this understanding. . . . In particular, the majority zeros in on the disjunctive conjunction “or,” and proceeds to build its entire opinion around that linguistic feature. The majority admits that “arise out of” may connote causation. But, it argues, “relate to” is an independent clause that does not.

Where this leaves us is far from clear. For a case to “relate to” the defendant’s forum contacts, the majority says, it is enough if an “affiliation” or “relationship” or “connection” exists between them. But what does this assortment of nouns mean? Loosed from any causation standard, we are left to guess. The majority promises that its new test “does not mean anything goes,” but that hardly tells us what does. In some cases, the new test may prove more forgiving than the old causation rule. But it’s hard not to wonder whether it may also sometimes turn out to be more demanding. Unclear too is whether, in cases like that, the majority would treat causation and “affiliation” as alternative routes to specific jurisdiction, or whether it would deny jurisdiction outright.

For a glimpse at the complications invited by today’s decision, consider its treatment of North Dakota and Washington. Those are the States where Ford first sold the allegedly defective cars at issue in the cases before us. The majority seems to suggest that, if the plaintiffs had sought to bring their suits in those States, they would have failed. The majority stresses that the “only connection” between the plaintiffs’ claims and North Dakota and Washington is the fact that former owners once bought the allegedly defective cars there. But the majority never tells us why that “connection” isn’t enough. Surely, North Dakota and Washington would contend they have a strong interest in ensuring they don’t become marketplaces for unreasonably dangerous products. Nor is it clear why the majority casts doubt on the availability of specific jurisdiction in these States without bothering to consider whether the old causation test might allow it. After all, no one doubts Ford purposefully availed itself of those markets. The plaintiffs’ injuries, at least arguably, “arose from” (or were caused by) the sale of defective cars in those places. Even if the majority’s new affiliation test isn’t satisfied, don’t we still need to ask those causation questions, or are they now to be abandoned?

Consider, too, a hypothetical the majority offers in a footnote. The majority imagines a retiree in Maine who starts a one-man business, carving and selling wooden duck decoys. In time, the man sells a defective decoy over the Internet to a purchaser in another State who is injured. [Citing footnote 4 of the majority opinion.] We aren't told how. (Was the decoy coated in lead paint?) But put that aside. The majority says this hypothetical supplies a useful study in contrast with our cases. On the majority's telling, Ford's "continuous" contacts with Montana and Minnesota are enough to establish an "affiliation" with those States; by comparison, the decoy seller's contacts may be too "isolated" and "sporadic" to entitle an injured buyer to sue in his home State. But if this comparison highlights anything, it is only the litigation sure to follow. For between the poles of "continuous" and "isolated" contacts lie a virtually infinite number of "affiliations" waiting to be explored. And when it comes to that vast terrain, the majority supplies no meaningful guidance about what kind or how much of an "affiliation" will suffice. Nor, once more, does the majority tell us whether its new affiliation test supplants or merely supplements the old causation inquiry.

Not only does the majority's new test risk adding new layers of confusion to our personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The whole project seems unnecessary. Immediately after disavowing any need for a causal link between the defendant's forum activities and the plaintiffs' injuries, the majority proceeds to admit that such a link may be present here. The majority stresses that the Montana and Minnesota plaintiffs before us "might" have purchased their cars because of Ford's activities in their home States. They "may" have relied on Ford's local advertising. And they "may" have depended on Ford's promise to furnish in-state servicers and dealers. If the majority is right about these things, that would be more than enough to establish a but-for causal link between Ford's in-state activities and the plaintiffs' decisions to purchase their allegedly defective vehicles. Nor should that result come as a surprise: One might expect such causal links to be easy to prove in suits against corporate behemoths like Ford. All the new euphemisms—"affiliation," "relationship," "connection"—thus seem pretty pointless.¹

*

With the old *International Shoe* dichotomy looking increasingly uncertain, it's hard not to ask how we got here and where we might be headed.

Before *International Shoe*, it seems due process was usually understood to guarantee that only a court of competent jurisdiction could deprive a defendant of his life, liberty, or property. In turn, a court's competency normally depended on the defendant's presence in, or consent to, the sovereign's jurisdiction. But once a plaintiff was able to "tag" the defendant with process in the jurisdiction, that State's courts were generally thought competent to render judgment on any claim against the defendant, whether it involved events inside or outside the State. *Pennoyer v. Neff*, 95 U. S. 714, 733 (1878); *Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin*, 495 U. S. 604, 610–

¹ The majority says personal jurisdiction should not turn on a plaintiff's ability to "allege" or "establish" his or her reasons for doing business with the defendant. But the implicit assumption here—that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction—is often mistaken. Perhaps because a lack of personal jurisdiction is a waivable affirmative defense, some States place the burden of proving the defense on the defendant. Even in places where the plaintiff bears the burden, I fail to see why it would be so terrible (or burdensome) to require an individual to plead and prove his or her reasons for purchase. Frequently, doing so may be simple—far simpler than showing how the defendant's connections with the jurisdiction satisfy a new and amorphous "affiliation" test.

611 (1990); J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 912–913 (3d ed. 1846); *Massie v. Watts*, 6 Cranch 148, 157, 161–162 (1810).²

International Shoe's emergence may be attributable to many influences, but at least part of the story seems to involve the rise of corporations and interstate trade. See *Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg*, 512 U. S. 415, 431 (1994). A corporation doing business in its State of incorporation is one thing; the old physical presence rules for individuals seem easily adaptable to them. But what happens when a corporation, created and able to operate thanks to the laws of one State, seeks the privilege of sending agents or products into another State?

Early on, many state courts held conduct like that renders an out-of-state corporation present in the second jurisdiction. And a present company could be sued for any claim, so long as the plaintiff served an employee doing corporate business within the second State. E.g., *Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer*, 197 U. S. 407, 413–415 (1905). Other States sought to obviate any potential question about corporate jurisdiction by requiring an out-of-state corporation to incorporate under their laws too, or at least designate an agent for service of process. Either way, the idea was to secure the out-of-state company's presence or consent to suit. E.g., *Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.*, 243 U. S. 93, 95-96 (1917).

Unsurprisingly, corporations soon looked for ways around rules like these. No one, after all, has ever liked greeting the process server. For centuries, individuals facing imminent suit sought to avoid it by fleeing the court's territorial jurisdiction. But this tactic proved "too crude for the American business genius," and it held some obvious disadvantages. See Jackson, *What Price "Due Process,"* 5 N. Y. L. Rev. 435, 436 (1927). Corporations wanted to retain the privilege of sending their personnel and products to other jurisdictions where they lacked a charter to do business. At the same time, when confronted with lawsuits in the second forum, they sought to hide behind their foreign charters and deny their presence. Really, their strategy was to do business without being seen to do business. *Id.*, at 438 ("No longer is the foreign corporation confronted with the problem 'to be or not to be'—it can both be and not be!").

Initially and routinely, state courts rejected ploys like these. See, e.g., *Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence*, 74 Miss. 782, 796–799, 22 So. 53, 55–56 (Miss. 1897). But, in a series of decisions at the turn of the last century, this Court eventually provided a more receptive audience. On the one hand, the Court held that an out-of-state corporation often has a right to do business in another State unencumbered by that State's registration rules, thanks to the so-called dormant Commerce Clause. *International Textbook Co. v. Pigg*, 217 U. S. 91, 107–112 (1910). On the other hand, the Court began invoking the Due Process Clause to restrict the circumstances in which an out-of-state corporation could be deemed present. So, for example, the Court ruled that even an

² Some disagree that due process requires even this much. Recent scholarship, for example, contends *Pennoyer*'s territorial account of sovereign power is mostly right, but the rules it embodies are not "fixed in constitutional amber"—that is, Congress might be able to change them. Sachs, *Pennoyer Was Right*, 95 Texas L. Rev. 1249, 1255 (2017). Others suggest that fights over personal jurisdiction would be more sensibly waged under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Jackson, *Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution*, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1945). Whether these theories are right or wrong, they at least seek to answer the right question—what the Constitution as originally understood requires, not what nine judges consider "fair" and "just."

Oklahoma corporation purchasing a large portion of its merchandise in New York was not “doing business” there. *Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.*, 260 U. S. 516, 517–518 (1923). Perhaps advocates of this arrangement thought it promoted national economic growth. See Dodd, *Jurisdiction in Personal Actions*, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427, 444–445 (1929). But critics questioned its fidelity to the Constitution and traditional jurisdictional principles, noting that it often left injured parties with no practical forum for their claims too. Jackson, 5 N. Y. L. Rev., at 436–438.

In many ways, *International Shoe* sought to start over. The Court “cast . . . aside” the old concepts of territorial jurisdiction that its own earlier decisions had seemingly twisted in favor of out-of-state corporations. *Burnham*, 495 U. S., at 618. At the same time, the Court also cast doubt on the idea, once pursued by many state courts, that a company “consents” to suit when it is forced to incorporate or designate an agent for receipt of process in a jurisdiction other than its home State. *Ibid.*³ In place of nearly everything that had come before, the Court sought to build a new test focused on “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” *International Shoe*, 326 U. S., at 316 (quoting *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940)).

It was a heady promise. But it is unclear how far it has really taken us. Even today, this Court usually considers corporations “at home” and thus subject to general jurisdiction in only one or two States. All in a world where global conglomerates boast of their many “headquarters.” The Court has issued these restrictive rulings, too, even though individual defendants remain subject to the old “tag” rule, allowing them to be sued on any claim anywhere they can be found. *Burnham*, 495 U. S., at 610–611.⁴ Nearly 80 years removed from *International Shoe*, it seems corporations continue to receive special jurisdictional protections in the name of the Constitution. Less clear is why.

Maybe, too, *International Shoe* just doesn’t work quite as well as it once did. For a period, its specific jurisdiction test might have seemed a reasonable new substitute for assessing corporate “presence,” a way to identify those out-of-state corporations that were simply pretending to be absent from jurisdictions where they were really transacting business. When a company “purposefully availed” itself of the benefits of another State’s market in the 1940s, it often involved sending in agents, advertising in local media, or developing a network of on-the-ground dealers, much as Ford did in these cases. But, today, even an individual retiree carving wooden decoys in Maine can “purposefully avail” himself of the chance to do business across the continent after drawing online orders to his e-Bay “store” thanks to Internet advertising with global reach. A test once aimed at keeping corporations honest about their out-of-state operations now seemingly risks hauling individuals to jurisdictions where they have never set foot.

Perhaps this is the real reason why the majority introduces us to the hypothetical decoy salesman. Yes, he arguably availed himself of a new market. Yes, the plaintiff’s injuries arguably arose from (or were caused by) the product he sold there. Yes, *International Shoe*’s old causation

³ It is unclear what remains of the old “consent” theory after *International Shoe*’s criticism. Some courts read *International Shoe* and the cases that follow as effectively foreclosing it, while others insist it remains viable. Compare *Lanham v. BNSF R. Co.*, 305 Neb. 124, 130–136, 939 N. W. 2d 363, 368–371 (Neb. 2020), with *Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co.*, 2019-NMCA-023, ¶12–¶14, 458 P. 3d 569, 575–576 (N. M. Ct. App. 2018).

⁴ Since *Burnham*, some courts have sought to revive the tag rule for artificial entities while others argue that doing so would be inconsistent with *International Shoe*. Compare *First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP*, 154 F. 3d 16, 20–21 (CA2 1998), with *Martinez v. Aero Caribbean*, 764 F. 3d 1062, 1067–1069 (CA9 2014).

test would seemingly allow for personal jurisdiction. But maybe the majority resists that conclusion because the old test no longer seems as reliable a proxy for determining corporate presence as it once did. Maybe *that's* the intuition lying behind the majority's introduction of its new "affiliation" rule and its comparison of the Maine retiree's "sporadic" and "isolated" sales in the plaintiff's State and Ford's deep "relationships" and "connections" with Montana and Minnesota.

If that is the logic at play here, I cannot help but wonder if we are destined to return where we began. Perhaps all of this Court's efforts since *International Shoe*, including those of today's majority, might be understood as seeking to recreate in new terms a jurisprudence about corporate jurisdiction that was developing before this Court's muscular interventions in the early 20th century. Perhaps it was, is, and in the end always will be about trying to assess fairly a corporate defendant's presence or consent. *International Shoe* may have sought to move past those questions. But maybe all we have done since is struggle for new words to express the old ideas. Perhaps, too, none of this should come as a surprise. New technologies and new schemes to evade the process server will always be with us. But if our concern is with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," *International Shoe*, 326 U. S., at 316 (emphasis added), not just our personal and idiosyncratic impressions of those things, perhaps we will always wind up asking variations of the same questions.⁵

None of this is to cast doubt on the outcome of these cases. The parties have not pointed to anything in the Constitution's original meaning or its history that might allow Ford to evade answering the plaintiffs' claims in Montana or Minnesota courts. No one seriously questions that the company, seeking to do business, entered those jurisdictions through the front door. And I cannot see why, when faced with the process server, it should be allowed to escape out the back. Jackson, 5 N. Y. L. Rev., at 439. The real struggle here isn't with settling on the right outcome in these cases, but with making sense of our personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and *International Shoe's* increasingly doubtful dichotomy. On those scores, I readily admit that I finish these cases with even more questions than I had at the start. Hopefully, future litigants and lower courts will help us face these tangles and sort out a responsible way to address the challenges posed by our changing economy in light of the Constitution's text and the lessons of history.

NOTES

1. Notice how frequently the majority opinion uses phrases that, before *Goodyear* and *Daimler*, were relevant to the assessment of general jurisdiction: Ford's business in the two states was "continuous" and "systematic," and Ford "extensively" and "regularly" marketed its vehicles there. Justice Alito's concurrence refers to Ford's "heavy presence" in the two states. Is the defendant's *level* of activity in the forum relevant to the question of whether the plaintiff's claim

⁵ The majority worries that the thoughts expressed here threaten to "transfigure our specific jurisdiction standard as applied to corporations" and "return [us] to the mid-19th century." [Citing footnotes 2 and 3 from majority opinion.] But it has become a tired trope to criticize any reference to the Constitution's original meaning as (somehow) both radical and antiquated. Seeking to understand the Constitution's original meaning is part of our job. What's the majority's real worry anyway—that corporations might lose special protections? The Constitution has always allowed suits against individuals on any issue in any State where they set foot. Yet the majority seems to recoil at even entertaining the possibility the Constitution might tolerate similar results for "nationwide corporation[s]," whose "business is everywhere."

is sufficiently related to it? If so, is the Court endorsing a sliding scale approach, under which a greater level of activity will support specific jurisdiction based upon a less demanding “relate to” basis (rather than a more demanding “arises out of” basis)?

2. At page 160 of the Casebook is a note delineating a three-step analysis for specific jurisdiction under *International Shoe*. Does that suggested analysis survive the majority’s reasoning in *Ford Motor*? If not, what is the analytical framework now?

3. Consideration of the forum state’s interest – for example, in providing redress for its citizens and enforcing its regulations for motor safety – is relevant to the assessment of personal jurisdiction. Before *Ford Motor*, such state interests were listed as one of the “fairness factors” to be addressed in determining whether specific jurisdiction would be fair or reasonable. How does the state’s interest fit into the analysis now?

4. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion in *Bristol-Myers*, and saw no need to parse the phrase “arises out of or relates to.” Is his concurring opinion in *Ford Motor* a defensive reaction to the majority’s making a distinction he did not make (between “arises out of” and “relates to”)? Or does he have a broader point?

5. Is Justice Gorsuch urging a return to *Pennoyer v. Neff*? If so, would that automatically result in narrowing personal jurisdiction from where it now stands? After all, the “traditional bases” recognized in *Pennoyer* all supported what today would be considered general jurisdiction. And, as Justice Gorsuch, “tag” jurisdiction over corporations developed in the pre-*International Shoe* era. *Goodyear*, *Daimler*, and *BNSF*, which limit general jurisdiction over corporations to (usually) two states, are products of the “modern” *International Shoe* regime.

6. Though the result in *Ford Motor* was unanimous, note that only eight Justices participated in the case. Three of those eight parted company sufficiently regarding some aspect of the reasoning to join concurring opinions.

7. *Ford* is generating a good deal of scholarly attention. Professor Rhodes uses the decision as a lens through which to view the Roberts Court’s fundamental transformation of personal jurisdiction doctrine. That transformation included the “new era” restriction of general jurisdiction, which required the Court to intervene to clarify the possibility that companies might be amenable to jurisdiction on tort claims in states other than those in which they are “at home” or to which they marketed the product that allegedly injured the plaintiff. Charles W. (Rocky) Rhodes, *The Roberts Court’s Jurisdictional Revolution within Ford’s Frame*, 51 *Stetson L. Rev.* 157 (2022). See also Scott Dodson, *Personal Jurisdiction, Comparativism, and Ford*, 51 *Stetson L. Rev.* 187 (2022) and Linda Sandstrom Simard, *Charles W. (Rocky) Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Ford Motor Co.: The Murky Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction*, 5 *Am. Const. Soc’y Sup. Ct. Rev.* 119 (2021). Professor George argues that *Ford Motor* is further evidence of the bankruptcy of the minimum contacts test, in part because the Court had to return essentially to the sliding scale approach that it purported to reject in *Bristol-Myers Squibb*. See James P. George, *Running on Empty: Ford v. Montana and the Folly of Minimum Contacts*, 30 *Geo. Mason L. Rev.* 1 (2022).

Professor Borchers argues that concurring opinions by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Thomas) and Justice Alito may signal that those jurists – and perhaps others – are contemplating a paradigm shift away from the *International Shoe* regime. In particular, he asserts that the requirement of purposeful contact is not rooted in history. Moreover, jurisdictional due process is an awkward fit for substantive due process and should be based in the “fair procedures” branch of due process jurisprudence. Patrick J. Borchers, *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court* and “Corporate Tag Jurisdiction” in the Pennoyer Era, 72 *Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev.* 45 (2021).

Professor Borchers, joined by Professors Arthur and Freer, hails Ford as a welcome return to serious consideration of the fairness prong of personal jurisdiction analysis. The authors explore various questions left open by Ford, including the possibility that it has introduced a sliding scale approach to relatedness depending upon the level of contact between the defendant and the forum. *Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District: Some Answers, Lots of Questions*, 71 *Emory L.J. Online* 1 (2021).

There is a symposium on the “new era” of personal jurisdiction, which commenced in 2011, at 73 *Alabama L. Rev.* 483 et seq. (2022), featuring articles by (1) Gardiner, Cookman, Bradt, Clopton & Rave, (2) Solum & Crema, (3) Lahav, (4) Freer, (5) Cook & D’Entrement, and (6) Wirtes & Rue.

At page 141, after Note 7, please insert the following:

Note on General Jurisdiction, Consent, and Registration Statutes

Every state has “registration” statutes that require foreign (out-of-state) businesses to register as a condition of doing business in the state. The statutes require the foreign business to appoint a “registered agent” for service of process in the state, to pay fees to the state, and to file periodic reports. Service of process on the registered agent provides personal jurisdiction over the company on the basis of consent and not on the basis of contacts. *Pennoyer* recognized states’ ability to condition doing business on the appointment of an agent for service of process.

In *Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.*, 243 U.S. 93 (1917), the Court unanimously upheld a Missouri registration statute that provided for general jurisdiction.

In the *International Shoe* era, the Supreme Court said little about consent as a basis of personal jurisdiction in the corporate context. *Pennsylvania Fire* was never overruled, but some courts and commentators concluded that it did not survive the “minimum contacts” revolution of *International Shoe*. The issue has come to the fore recently, with the restriction on contacts-based general jurisdiction in *Daimler*. With *Daimler* restricting general jurisdiction over a business, usually, to two states, plaintiffs have focused more on whether registration constitutes consent to general jurisdiction.

The initial consideration, of course, is whether the statute provides for general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. The statutes in most states are not clear on this point. Indeed, it appears that only Pennsylvania expressly provides that registration grants general jurisdiction. Other states have interpreted their statutes to grant general jurisdiction. Many, however, conclude that their statutes provide only specific jurisdiction.

The next consideration is whether jurisdiction would be constitutional. Those states upholding general jurisdiction “usually focus[] on the issue of consent — that by registering to do business pursuant to the state registration statute, a corporation has expressly consented to jurisdiction. Since consent is an independent basis for jurisdiction, separate and apart from minimum contacts, no additional due process analysis is necessary. The corporation's consent, in itself, satisfies due process.” Tanya J. Monestier, *Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent*, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1370 (2015).

Upholding general jurisdiction on the basis of consent presents a clash with *Daimler*, which restricted general jurisdiction over corporations to their state of incorporation and their state of principal place of business.

The Supreme Court addressed the issue in *Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway*, 143 S. Ct. 2028 (2023). There, a Virginia resident, worked in Ohio and Virginia for the defendant railway (headquartered and incorporated in Virginia). He sued the company, alleging that exposure to substances on the job caused his cancer. He sued in Pennsylvania and had the defendant served with process under its registration statute (which, as noted, expressly provides for general jurisdiction). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute, though the separate opinions create considerable uncertainty.

At core was the question of whether *Pennsylvania Fire*, a 1917 case, was still controlling. The majority of five, in an opinion by Justice Gorsuch, concluded that the old case governed the outcome:

Pennsylvania Fire controls this case. Much like the Missouri law at issue there, the Pennsylvania law at issue here provides that an out-of-state corporation “may not do business in this Commonwealth until it registers with” the Department of State. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 411(a). As part of the registration process, a corporation must identify an “office” it will “continuously maintain” in the Commonwealth. § 411(f); see also § 412(a)(5). Upon completing these requirements, the corporation “shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as a domestic entity and shall be subject to the same liabilities, restrictions, duties and penalties ... imposed on domestic entities.” § 402(d). Among other things, Pennsylvania law is explicit that “qualification as a foreign corporation” shall permit state courts to “exercise general personal jurisdiction” over a registered foreign corporation, just as they can over domestic corporations. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5301(a)(2)(i). 143 S. Ct. at 2037.

But the Court failed to muster a majority on why the holding was constitutional. In his plurality opinion, Justice Gorsuch argued that consent provides an *additional* path to constitutional personal jurisdiction – one that does not require minimum contacts analysis. 143 S. Ct. at 2039. According to Justice Gorsuch, Norfolk Southern complied knowingly with the Pennsylvania law, and this consent satisfies due process. Justice Jackson agreed, noting that there

is no question that Norfolk Southern waived its personal-jurisdiction rights here. As the Court ably explains, Norfolk Southern agreed to register as a foreign corporation in Pennsylvania in exchange for the ability to conduct business within the Commonwealth and receive associated benefits. Moreover, when Norfolk Southern made that decision, the jurisdictional consequences of registration were clear. 143 S.Ct. at 2046.

Justice Jackson also discussed the relationship between consent and waiver. Because personal jurisdiction is an individual liberty right, waiver is:

a critical feature of the personal jurisdiction analysis. * * * A defendant can waive its rights by explicitly or implicitly consenting to litigate future disputes in a particular State's courts. A defendant might also fail to follow specific procedural rules, and end up waiving the right to object to personal jurisdiction as a consequence. Or a defendant can voluntarily invoke certain benefits from a State that are conditioned on submitting to the State's jurisdiction.

Id. at 2045.

Is this consideration of waiver appropriate in *Mallory*? After all, the defendant operated a railroad that connected multiple states. Is it realistic that it could refuse to register to do business in Pennsylvania?

In his long concurring opinion, Justice Alito agreed that *Pennsylvania Fire* controlled the outcome but emphasized that the defendant in *Mallory* had a substantial business presence in Pennsylvania. He suggested that other constitutional concerns (beyond due process) might limit the exercise of corporate registration statutes if a defendant did not have such a substantial presence in the forum. 143 S. Ct. at 2049.

Specifically, Justice Alito raised possible limitations on the exercise of state territorial power from the so-called "dormant commerce clause:"

The federalism concerns that this case presents fall more naturally within the scope of the Commerce Clause. * * * But this Court has long held that the Clause includes a negative component, the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, that "prohibits state laws that unduly restrict interstate commerce." *Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v. Thomas*, 139 S.Ct. 2449, 2459, (2019).

In its negative aspects, the Commerce Clause serves to "mediate [the States'] competing claims of sovereign authority" to enact regulations that affect commerce among the States. * * * It is especially appropriate to look to the dormant Commerce Clause in considering the constitutionality of the authority asserted by Pennsylvania's registration scheme. Because the right of an out-of-state corporation to do business in another State is based on the dormant Commerce Clause, it stands to reason that this doctrine may also limit a State's authority to condition that right. This Court and other courts have long examined assertions of jurisdiction over out-of-state companies in light of interstate commerce concerns. * * *

In my view, there is a good prospect that Pennsylvania's assertion of jurisdiction here—over an out-of-state company in a suit brought by an out-of-state plaintiff on claims wholly unrelated to Pennsylvania—violates the Commerce Clause. Under our modern framework, a state law may offend the Commerce Clause's negative restrictions in two circumstances: when the law discriminates against interstate commerce or when it imposes "undue burdens" on interstate commerce. *South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.*, 138 S.Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018). Discriminatory state laws are subject to " 'a virtually *per se* rule of invalidity.' " *Ibid.* * * *

There is reason to believe that Pennsylvania's registration-based jurisdiction law discriminates against out-of-state companies. But at the very least, the law imposes a "significant burden" on interstate commerce by "[r]equiring a foreign corporation ... to defend itself with reference to all transactions," including those with no forum connection. *Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988).

143 S. Ct. at 2051-54.

Justice Barrett, joined by three other dissenters, rejected these approaches and cautioned that while the Court’s “approach does not formally overrule our traditional contacts-based approach to jurisdiction, [it] might as well. By relabeling their long-arm statutes, States may now manufacture ‘consent’ to personal jurisdiction.” 143 S. Ct. at 2055.

The dissenters also doubted that consent was an adequate constitutional theory on which to uphold Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction:

[The] argument begins on shaky ground, because Pennsylvania itself does not treat registration as synonymous with consent. Section 5301(a)(2)(i) baldly asserts that “qualification as a foreign corporation” in the Commonwealth is a sufficient hook for general jurisdiction. The *next* subsection (invoked by neither Mallory nor the Court) permits the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation based on “[c]onsent, to the extent authorized by the consent.” § 5301(a)(2)(ii). If registration were actual consent, one would expect to see some mention of jurisdiction in Norfolk Southern’s registration paperwork—which is instead wholly silent on the matter. What Mallory calls “consent” is what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court called “compelled submission to general jurisdiction by legislative command.” Corporate registration triggers a statutory repercussion, but that is not “consent” in a conventional sense of the word.

To pull § 5301(a)(2)(i) under the umbrella of consent, the Court, * * * casts it as setting the terms of a bargain: In exchange for access to the Pennsylvania market, a corporation must allow the Commonwealth’s courts to adjudicate any and all claims against it, even those (like Mallory’s) having nothing to do with Pennsylvania. Everyone is charged with knowledge of the law, so corporations are on notice of the deal. By registering, they agree to its terms.

While this is a clever theory, it falls apart on inspection. The Court grounds consent in a corporation’s choice to register with knowledge (constructive or actual) of the jurisdictional consequences. But on that logic, *any* long-arm statute could be said to elicit consent. Imagine a law that simply provides, “any corporation doing business in this State is subject to general jurisdiction in our courts.” Such a law defies our precedent, which, again, holds that “in-state business ... does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction.” *BNSF*, 137 S.Ct. 1549. Yet this hypothetical law, like the Pennsylvania statute, gives notice that general jurisdiction is the price of doing business. And its “notice” is no less “clear” than Pennsylvania’s. So on the Court’s reasoning, corporations that choose to do business in the State impliedly consent to general jurisdiction. The result: A State could defeat the Due Process Clause by adopting a law at odds with the Due Process Clause.

That makes no sense. If the hypothetical statute overreaches, then Pennsylvania’s does too.
143 S. Ct. at 2057.

In *Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall*, 863 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 2021), the Georgia Supreme Court, applying a registration statute interpreted to provide general jurisdiction, upheld jurisdiction on statutory and constitutional grounds. The defendant sought certiorari at the Supreme Court. After deciding *Mallory*, the Court denied certiorari in *Cooper*, which leaves the Georgia decision intact.

In light of *Mallory*, is it likely that states will rush to enact registration statutes providing expressly for general jurisdiction?

Chapter 4. Limitations on the Exercise of Jurisdiction

Section 3. Forum Non Conveniens

At page 248, please add the following at the end of Note 3:

In *ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd.*, 142 S. Ct. 2078 (2022), the Supreme Court held that a private arbitration panel is not a “foreign or international tribunal” for purposes of § 1782. Such panels are not imbued with governmental authority. Moreover, applying § 1782 to private arbitrations abroad would create an asymmetry with arbitration in the United States, in which discovery is typically not as broad as that permitted under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Chapter 5. Foreign Judgments

Section 1. Policies Underlying the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

At page 285, please add the following at the end of Note 7:

The European Union (except for Denmark) has now ratified the Convention, which counts as one ratification. Once there is a second ratification, the Convention will go into force as between the ratifying nations. For a discussion of the Convention and its possible interplay with the Brussels Regulations, see Note 3, page 120 (this Supplement).

Chapter 8. Choosing the Rule of Decision

Section 4. Rules Again?

At page 667, please add the following to the end of the Note

Further evidence that the *lex loci delicti* rule is not always easily applied comes from *Nunes v. Cable News Network*, 31 F.4th 135 (2d Cir. 2022). The Second Circuit applied Virginia’s traditional conflicts approach because of a venue transfer. The plaintiff was a California congressman who claimed to have been libeled by CNN. The court noted that the alleged damage to his reputation occurred everywhere the broadcast was seen making rote application of the *lex loci delicti* rule “impracticable and unworkable.” Attempting to predict what the Virginia Supreme Court would do, the Second Circuit applied California law because the Congressman’s reputation was centered there. Note that Section 150(2) of the Second Restatement endorses the presumptive application of a plaintiff’s domicile in cases of multistate defamation.

Chapter 9. Conflicts Problems in Federal and International Settings

Section 2. Conflicts Problems in International Settings

At page 818, please add the following after Note 5:

6. The Court provided guidance on the “domestic injury” requirement of the *RJR Nabisco* test in *Yegiazaryan v. Smagin*, 143 S. Ct. 1900 (2023). There, the plaintiff, a Russian residing in Russia, had won a large arbitration award against another Russian, who resided in California. The defendant had tried to evade satisfying the arbitration award. The plaintiff sued in a California federal court (1) to confirm the arbitration award under the New York Convention (to which Russia and the U.S. are both signatories) and (2) for violation of RICO by conspiring with banks and other entities to avoid paying the arbitration award. In determining whether there had been a domestic injury, the Court rejected a rigid test based upon the plaintiff’s residence. Instead, it adopted a “context dependent” approach and concluded that the case had enough connection to California to satisfy the domestic injury requirement.

Much of the alleged racketeering activity by which the defendant sought to avoid payment occurred in the United States, including creating shell companies to hide assets and intimidating an American-based witness. Moreover, the acts were allegedly taken to thwart the enforcement of a judgment entered in California.

Justice Alito, the author of the majority opinion in *RJR Nabisco*, dissented (joined by three others). He asserted that because the injured party was a Russian citizen living in Russia, the injury was foreign, not domestic.